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Managing Capital Market Risk for Retirement 
Abstract 
We offer an overview of solutions available to pension plans to manage capital market risk in order to 
meet their obligations. We outline the main drivers behind the evolution of asset-liability management 
(ALM) for pension plans and the emergence of liability-driven investment (LDI) in the last decade. We look 
at some of the most popular pension de-risking tools and at recent innovations prompted by the Global 
Financial Crisis. We offer examples based on the rise of cross-asset correlation, the use of hybrid 
products to mitigate tail risk, and the increasing relevance of counterparty risk mitigation tools such as 
collateralization. We conclude by outlining some of the main challenges ahead, including developments in 
pension regulation, centralized clearing of over-the-counter (OTC) instruments, and risk taking incentives 
in delegated asset management for long term retirement obligations. 
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Managing Capital Market Risk for Retirement
Enrico Biffis and Robert Kosowski
The Emergence of Liability-driven Investment
Liabilities of  corporate and public defined benefit (DB) pension plans have reached 
unprecedented levels in the last decade, due to increases in life expectancy and 
underperformance of  the assets backing the promises. Pension trustees have 
addressed the deterioration of  funding levels in different ways, working both on the 
asset and liability sides. On the liability side, there have been closures of  schemes to 
new members as well as to new accruals, in order to cap liabilities. On the asset side, 
there has been a stronger focus on asset liability management (ALM), which has 
translated into ‘de-risking’ strategies tilting asset allocations away from equities and 
toward liability-driven investment (LDI).
LDI differs from the simple approach to asset management which aims to maxi-
mize the return of  a portfolio for a given level of  portfolio risk (volatility) without 
taking liabilities explicitly into account. In fact, LDI is a strategy based on the cash 
flows needed to fund future liabilities. It can be applied to both DB and defined 
contribution (DC) pension plans. In the latter, investment decisions and risk rest 
with the employee; the plan’s liability is employee-specific. In the former, pension 
plan sponsors, with the assistance of  actuaries, forecast future anticipated cash pay-
outs to pensioners over their expected lifetimes. From the perspective of  a DB plan 
sponsor, risk entails two main components: investment risk and liability risk, the 
latter stemming from the stochastic value of  pension liabilities. A pension plan’s 
funded status can change due to a change in liabilities, even if  investment risk is 
carefully managed. Although the notion of  LDI is not new (there are references to 
it by U.K. actuaries going back to the 1930s), its adoption among pension plans has 
only recently become more widespread (Kessler 2014).
The ALM problem faced by a DB pension plan can be represented by a com-
plex dynamic optimization problem. For simplicity, some academic studies abstract 
from the dynamic nature of  the problem and use surplus optimization as a method 
to reflect the presence of  liabilities and its effect on optimal portfolio choice (e.g. 
Sharpe and Tint 1990; Ezra 1991; Leibowitz et al. 1992; Nijman and Swinkels 
2008). These works treat fund liabilities as a state variable and specify an objective 
function of  assets relative to liabilities. The objective function takes into account 
the correlation between assets and liabilities in determining the optimal portfolio 
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allocation. Surplus at each time t is defined as S k A k Lt t t( ) = − , where At denotes 
the value of  the assets at time t and Lt the value of  the liabilities, whereas the 
parameter k measures the importance that the fund management attaches to the 
value of  the liabilities. The return on the fund surplus can be then be defined as 
R kRk Rt
s
t
A
t
L( ) = − , where R kt
s ( ) , R t
A , and R t
L  are the return on the surplus, 
the assets, and the liabilities, respectively, and k kLt At= − − 1 1/  (e.g. Sharpe and Tint 
1990).
If  we assume that the pension fund manager has a mean-variance utility func-
tion with risk aversion coefficient γ in the return on surplus, we can derive a closed 
form solution for the optimal asset allocation. For example, Nijman and Swinkels 
(2008) use this framework to study whether the risk of  investment portfolios of  pen-
sion schemes investing in traditional asset classes can be reduced by non-traditional 
investment opportunities such as commodities. They find that the benefits for pen-
sion plans with inflation-indexed liabilities are substantial, but they are not large for 
those with nominal liabilities.
Dynamic ALM
One caveat to this simple static surplus return optimization framework is that it 
captures only time-varying asset allocation as a result of  a repeated application of  
the static framework. In practice, however, pension asset allocation can be expected 
to change over time, as market conditions change and/or the plan matures. Over 
time, assets may be moved away from the return-seeking component of  the portfo-
lio and placed into the liability-hedging component. A pension plan sponsor may, 
for example, decide to take on more risk when a plan is underfunded, to generate a 
higher return in the hope that the funding status improves. But once a plan’s ratio 
of  assets to liabilities (that is, the funded status or funding ratio) reaches a comfort-
able enough level, sponsors often investigate the possibility of  closing or terminat-
ing the plan in an effort to remove risk to the plan sponsor; see the discussion of  
pension buyouts below.
A more general approach to the pension manager’s utility function was devel-
oped by Rudolf  and Ziemba (2004).1 They do so using a portfolio selection model 
for an investment company seeking to maximize the intertemporal expected utility 
of  the surplus of  assets net of  liabilities. They show that the optimal portfolio con-
sists of  investors holding a combination of  four portfolios: the market portfolio, a 
hedge portfolio for the relevant state variables, a hedge portfolio for the liabilities, 
and the riskless asset. In contrast to Merton’s (1973) result in the asset-only case, the 
liability hedge is independent of  preferences and depends only on the plan’s fund-
ing ratio. Demand for the state variable hedge and the market portfolio depends 
on the investor’s preferences. Detemple and Rindisbacher (2008) extend Rudolf  
and Ziemba (2004) by (a) allowing the factors in the model to follow a more general 
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diffusion process, and (b) defining preferences over intermediate cash flows, instead 
of  the surplus.2
The Spread of LDI
LDI has spread widely in recent years. The SEI Pension Management Research 
Panel (SEI 2012) has conducted an annual poll of  corporate pension plans since 
2007; in 2012, this poll was completed by 125 pension plans from the United States, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Figure 2.1 shows that since the 
poll’s inception, LDI more than tripled in use, from 20 percent in 2007 to 63 percent 
in 2011. The use of  LDI dipped to 57 percent in 2012, probably as a result of  low 
funding ratios and exceptional market conditions shaped by quantitative easing.
Of  those organizations not utilizing an LDI strategy in 2012, 20 percent said 
they planned to implement one by the end of  2013. The portion of  assets invested 
in LDI has also increased over time, as Figure 2.2 shows.
Of  those plans using LDI in 2012, over half  (52 percent) continued to invest 
more than 40 percent of  their portfolio in an LDI strategy; only 11 percent of  plans 
invested less than 20 percent. In other words, as a plan’s funding status improves, 
a greater portion of  its portfolio tends to be invested in LDI. It is instructive to see 
how pension sponsors and trustees define LDI. According to the SEI (2012) poll, 
most defined LDI in one of  two ways: ‘matching duration of  assets to duration of  
liabilities’ or ‘a portfolio designed to be risk managed with respect to liabilities’ (see 
Table 2.1).
Moreover, as shown in Table 2.2, most respondents to the SEI Global LDI Poll 
describe control of  the year-to-year volatility of  the funded status as the main goal 
of  LDI.
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Figure 2.1. Percentage of  funds adopting LDI strategies.
Source: SEI (2012).
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Figure 2.2. Percentage of  funds that use LDI strategy.
Notes: This figure shows the portion of  the portfolio invested in LDI among the funds that employ LDI. 
The percentages are shown for 2011 and 2012 as reported in the SEI 2012 poll.
Source: SEI (2012).
Table 2.1 Definition of  LDI according to respondents (percent)
Definition of  LDI 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Matching duration of  assets to duration of  
liabilities
41 30 40 30 46 39
A portfolio designed to be risk-managed with 
respect to liabilities
38 34 32 39 24 31
Consideration of  liability poll and/or costs in 
setting asset allocations
12 14 7 12 5 11
Immunizing the plan’s liabilities with fixed-income 
securities
2 6 5 7 12 8
Forcing asset performance to mimic liability 
performance
4 6 8 3 9 7
Use of  derivative instruments such as interest-rate 
swaps
1 1 1 4 2 2
Use of  asset classes with reduced volatility 1 9 7 5 2 2
Note: This shows how SEI poll respondents defined what LDI meant to them.
Source: SEI 6th Annual Global LDI Poll (SEI 2012).
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Pension De-risking
Next we provide an overview of  some common tools used in LDI and recent inno-
vations in pension de-risking solutions.
Interest-rate and Inflation-linked Derivatives
It is well known that the average duration of  pension liabilities is very long and 
quite difficult to match with standard fixed-income instruments. According to J.P. 
Morgan (2006), for example, the average duration gap of  European pension plans 
exceeded 13 years in 2006, with an average liability duration of  21 years, and an 
average duration of  fixed-income portfolios falling short of  eight years. These fig-
ures give an idea of  the challenges faced by ALM strategies relying on standard 
duration gap analysis or interest-rate immunization. In countries where pension 
regulation has become more transparent and risk-based, notably the U.K. and the 
Netherlands, pension plans have made structural changes in asset allocation, gear-
ing their portfolios toward liability matching by relying on interest-rate derivatives 
and hedging programs structured by investment banks and asset managers. The 
most common products include interest-rate swaps, forward-starting swaps, and 
‘swaptions’ (i.e. options giving the right but not the obligation to enter a swap at a 
future date). These instruments represent a cheaper and more flexible alternative 
to bonds, as the latter are in limited supply at the long end of  the yield curve, and in 
any case would typically fall short of  the duration target that pension plans favor. 
Dynamic strategies in fixed-income derivatives also provide a natural way to take 
advantage of  movements in the yield curve that may allow the hedger to lock in 
a higher funding ratio as a result of  the valuation basis used in marking to market 
the liabilities. Moreover, the format of  fixed-income derivatives provides a natural 
template to address the exposure to other sources of  risk, such as inflation and other 
forms of  indexation of  pension payments. For example, in recent years, inflation 
Table 2.2 Goals of  LDI (percent)
Goals of  LDI 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Control of  year-to-year volatility of  funded 
status
79 79 90 46 78 80
Control contribution and/or pension expense 46 45 51 43 46 53
Minimize/maximize impact on corporate 
liquidity/cash flow
31 30 35 23 41 30
Improve funding levels 19 14 24 28 26 30
Progress plan toward termination or buyout 8 8 13 20 15 26
Avoid the minimum funding liability 14 13 9 7 5 6
Note: This shows how SEI poll respondents described the goals of  LDI.
Source: SEI 6th Annual Global LDI Poll (SEI 2012).
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swaps, inflation caps and floors, and related instruments have experienced a dra-
matic surge in popularity due to LDI programs. The market in these instruments is 
now quite liquid, provides an efficient alternative to inflation-linked treasuries, and 
can be used to gauge more precisely the market value of  pension liabilities.
Pension Buyouts and Buy-ins
The most direct way for a sponsor to reduce its exposure to pension risk is to transfer 
part of  its pension liabilities to a counterparty.3 The transfer may take several forms:
•	 A pension buyout, in the case where the original employer’s covenant is ended 
and the counterparty is another principal employer, meaning that all the lia-
bilities of  the pension plan, together with the responsibility to meet them, are 
transferred to another institution.
•	 A pension buy-in, in the case where the counterparty is a life insurer or reinsurer. 
The transaction essentially entails the purchase of  bulk-annuities to insure 
some or all the liabilities while retaining responsibility for them.
An active pension buyout market developed in the U.K. beginning in 2006, 
enjoying significant growth and attracting the participation of  major players in 
financial markets (LCP 2012). As a stylized example of  pension buyout, consider 
the case of  a DB plan with assets A and liabilities L, valued on an ‘ongoing basis’ 
by the plan actuary. When the plan’s assets are insufficient to cover the liabilities 
(i.e. A<L), the company recognizes a deficit of  L−A. If  A>L instead, the company’s 
plan has a surplus of  A−L. Life insurers are usually required to value liabilities 
under more prudent assumptions than pension plans (regarding future mortality 
improvements, inflation rates, and market yields), resulting in a larger valuation of  
the liabilities L’. This increases reported deficits or reduces reported surpluses when 
a company approaches an insurer for transfer of  its pension assets and liabilities. 
In the case of  a deficit, a company borrows the amount max(L’−A,0) and pays it 
to an insurer to buy out its pension assets and liabilities. The transaction allows 
the employer to offload the pension liabilities from its balance sheet. This means 
that the volatility of  assets and liabilities associated with the pension plan accounts, 
the payment of  management fees on the plan’s assets, and any levies charged for 
members’ protection insurance can be avoided (Coughlan 2014; Kessler 2014). If  
buyout costs are financed by borrowing, a regular loan replaces pension assets and 
liabilities on the balance sheet. From the point of  view of  the plan members, the 
pensions are secured in full—subject, of  course, to the solvency of  the life insurer.
Other alternatives exist in addition to the full buyout transactions. Partial buyouts/
ins may take different forms, and involve the transfer of  liabilities originating from 
a subgroup of  members (e.g. deferred pensions, pensions in payment, etc.) or pay-
able over a limited time-horizon (e.g. liabilities above ten years’ maturity). Another 
variation is represented by synthetic buy-ins (or do-it-yourself  buy-ins), whereby the 
pension plan enters a series of  swap contracts to hedge longevity, investment, and 
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inflation risks, so that the overall effect is similar to a traditional buy-in (Biffis and 
Blake 2010b; LCP 2012). The fixed payments of  the swaps are financed by using 
the income from the pension plan assets, which are retained by the hedger as col-
lateral and hence reduce its exposure to counterparty risk.
Longevity Swaps
Longevity swaps represent a recent innovation relative to traditional buyouts and 
buy-ins. They are agreements between two parties to exchange fixed payments 
against variable payments linked to the number of  survivors in a reference popula-
tion. They are used by pension plans to hedge longevity risk: that is, the exposure to 
the systematic risk of  mortality improvements, which cannot be mitigated by pool-
ing together large numbers of  lives. The non-financial nature of  the exposure to 
longevity risk is only apparent: the number of  active members or pensioners alive 
at each point in time acts as a multiplier for the financial exposure associated with 
(current and future) payments to the representative member of  a cohort of  active 
or retired individuals. In the language of  derivatives, longevity risk introduces a 
‘quanto’ component in pension liabilities,4 which can dramatically undermine LDI 
programs based on average notional exposures, particularly if  the latter are based 
on outdated mortality projections.
To date, longevity swaps transactions have mainly involved pension funds and 
annuity providers wanting to hedge their exposure to longevity risk without having 
to bear any basis risk (i.e. the risk of  mismatch between the hedger’s exposure and 
the reference population on which the hedging instrument is written). The variable 
payments in such longevity swaps are designed to match precisely the mortality 
experience of  each individual hedger: hence the name bespoke longevity swaps (Biffis 
and Blake 2010b; LCP 2012). This is essentially a form of  longevity risk insurance, 
similar to annuity reinsurance in reinsurance markets. A fundamental difference 
from other forms of  reinsurance, however, is that longevity swaps are typically col-
lateralized, whereas typical (re)insurance transactions are not (Biffis et al. 2012a). 
The main reason is that longevity swaps are often part of  a wider de-risking strat-
egy involving other collateralized instruments (interest-rate and inflation swaps, 
for example); additionally, pension plans have been increasingly concerned with 
counterparty risk in the wake of  the subprime crisis (as discussed further on in the 
chapter).5
Financial Innovation in the Wake of the  
Global Financial Crisis
The subprime crisis has accelerated the deterioration of  DB plans’ funding levels. 
Pension sponsors and trustees have addressed the downturn by working on both the 
liability and the asset sides. To cap liabilities, there have been a number of  closures 
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of  schemes to new members, as well as to new accruals. According to Hewitt 
Associates, ‘more than half  of  all [private-sector] employers surveyed at the start of  
[2009] were considering closing their final salary pension schemes to existing mem-
bers, effectively freezing retirement benefits at today’s levels’ (Cohen 2009). Even if  
liabilities are locked in once a DB plan is closed, there still remains the problem of  
meeting the pension payments as they fall due, which has led to keen interest in the 
U.K. pension buyout market experience on the part of  pension sponsors the world 
over. On the asset side, there has been a stronger focus on LDI programs. The inter-
est in de-risking strategies has extended beyond jurisdictions traditionally more 
active in LDI (such as the U.K., the Netherlands, and Scandinavian countries), and 
has materialized in large transactions taking place, for example, in North America.
In terms of  innovation in de-risking solutions, some of  the most important devel-
opments involve a stronger focus on tail-risk hedging, contagion, and cross-asset 
correlation, as well as counterparty risk management.
Tail-risk and Cross-asset Correlation
The secular increase in cross-asset correlation (due to the integration of  global finan-
cial markets and the deployment of  alpha-extraction strategies across asset classes) 
was taken to a new level by the macro uncertainty resulting from the subprime crisis. 
The risk-on/off trading style, whereby portfolio risk is adjusted up or down depend-
ing on macro-economic uncertainty, has exacerbated the co-movement of  different 
markets and strengthened the view that tail risk can be effectively proxied by measures 
of  correlation or contagion. This has boosted the structuring of  tail hedges relying 
on cross-asset derivatives (also called hybrid products)—in other words, instruments 
whose payoff is contingent on the price of  more than one asset class. As an example, 
we discuss the stock-bond correlation swaps used in some LDI programs.
Case Study: Stock–bond Correlation Swaps6
To illustrate tail-risk hedging based on hybrid products, consider the case of  
stock-bond correlation swaps. These are instruments paying the difference between 
a fixed rate agreed at inception (the swap rate) and the realized correlation between 
the changes in a stock market index and the changes in a bond yield or interest-rate 
swap rate.
Pension funds are natural candidates for entering a payer correlation swap (they 
pay fixed and receive the floating realized correlation), as they are net long stocks 
and net short bonds. Their position originates from their liabilities which are, to a 
first order, bond-like (although of  course they also depend on inflation and mortal-
ity rates). The empirical evidence suggests that during financial crises the correla-
tion between stock returns and bond yields increases dramatically, an effect known 
as ‘flight-to-safety,’ where investors sell stocks to buy treasuries (e.g. Fleming and 
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Remolona 1999; Gulko 2002; Connolly et al. 2005). This results in the liabilities 
of  pension funds rising in value (due to an increase in discount rates) by more than 
the asset side, depending on the equity/bond mix, thus generating a significant 
asset-liability mismatch. The correlation between bond and equity markets is 
likely to again become very important in the future, as bond yields are at histori-
cal lows and bond prices appear to be in bubble territory. Going forward, the risk 
is that short-term interest rates will eventually rise, leading to a significant sell-off 
in long-term bonds, as last happened in 1994. If  central banks raise rates in an 
environment of  improved economic growth and rising stock prices, the correlation 
between bond yields and stock returns can again suddenly increase.
To illustrate how a pension fund might benefit from a position in a payer 
stock-bond correlation swap, consider the following stylized example. Liabilities 
are proxied by 20-year duration bonds, whereas assets are invested in a 60/40 split 
across stocks and ten-year duration bonds. The split is consistent with the find-
ings of  Rauh (2009) and the duration mismatch with J.P. Morgan (2011). For a 
fully funded plan, we apply a shock of  10 percent to the stock price and the yield 
curve, which for simplicity is assumed to be flat. Figure 2.3 reports the percentage 
decrease in the funding ratio resulting from the individual shocks and a joint shock 
to stocks and bonds. The impact of  the interest-rate shock is higher than for stocks 
due to (a) the mismatch between the asset and liability stock/bond split, and (b) the 
duration mismatch. The effects are greatly amplified by a simultaneous shock, 
which can be regarded as a proxy for high stock-bond correlation.
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Figure 2.3. Funding ratio at risk from adverse shocks to assets and liabilities.
Note: The figure reports the percentage decrease in the funding ratio from the initial level of  
100 percent (i.e. A = L), as a result of  the 10 percent adverse shock to the stock price level and the (flat) 
yield curve separately, as well as jointly (correlated shock bar in the plot).
Source: Biffis et al. (2012b).
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If  the correlation between stocks and bonds were completely predictable, a pen-
sion fund manager with an ALM mandate would be able to adjust his portfolio 
today to take account of  changes in correlation tomorrow. Although some studies 
find common factors that display some predictability of  the second moments of  
stocks and bonds (e.g. Viceira 2012), the predictability of  correlation is far from 
perfect out-of-sample. Hence, correlation swaps offer an effective way to hedge 
against unexpected changes in correlation. Figure 2.4 shows the price (in correla-
tion points) of  an OTC swap contract written on the correlation between changes 
in S&P 500 returns and in the ten-year constant maturity swap (CMS) rate. The 
swap rate at the end of  April 2011 for the swap expiring in April 2012 (2013, 2014, 
2015, 2016) was 25 percent (31 percent, 32 percent, 34 percent, 35 percent). An 
investor could have thus entered a payer correlation swap allowing him to enter 
a long position in the realized correlation at the price of  a fixed correlation level 
equal to 32 percent over two years.
By taking a position in this product, the pension fund is exposed to the net pay-
ments from the instrument at each payment date, as well as to changes in the mar-
ket’s expectation of  future stock-bond correlation via the marking-to-market/
model procedure. Both the cashflow and mark-to-market channel can provide 
0
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Figure 2.4. Correlation swap rates for different maturities as of  April 8, 2011.
Notes: We plot the historical realized correlation (over one to five years to date) for comparison, 
demonstrating how the swap rate embeds a positive premium for short maturities and a negative 
premium for longer maturities. Gauging the correlation swap premium heavily depends on the 
methodology used to estimate the realized correlation.
Source: Biffis et al. (2012b); the investment bank which provided these quotes wishes to remain 
anonymous.
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significant benefits ex post (in case of  market distress) and ex ante (for regulatory valu-
ations and stress testing exercises). These benefits typically come at a lower price 
than for standard tail-risk hedging strategies relying on put options or VIX deriva-
tives. The reason is that the hybrid product provides insurance on a joint event 
(low stock prices and low yields) that may not occur in a downturn affecting both 
asset classes simultaneously, or in a stagflation environment characterized by rising 
yields and falling markets. The product can be priced even more cheaply as a result 
of  the inventories and rebalancing needs of  structuring desks operating across the 
LDI and other spaces.
To provide an example of  how a pension fund might go about choosing the allo-
cation to a correlation swap, Biffis et al. (2012b) first compute the implied volatili-
ties of  stocks and bonds.7 Using the model-free methodology of  Britten-Jones and 
Neuberger (2000), they back out the one-year implied volatility from options on the 
S&P 500 index and on ten-year Treasury bonds, and find evidence of  time-varying 
linkages between the implied volatilities of  stock and bond options which are not 
spanned by the available securities (see Biffis et al. 2012b). The presence of  uns-
panned correlation risk means that one cannot rely on replication arguments to 
price the correlation swap. The authors therefore take a stance on preferences and 
use a utility indifference argument. Specifically, they consider a representative DB 
pension plan manager with mean-variance preferences on surplus returns; they 
then determine the correlation swap rate as the fixed leg that zeros the price of  the 
swap at inception and makes the pension fund indifferent between entering the 
position or not. The dynamics of  stock prices and bond yields are modeled (under 
the realistic measure) with a Wishart process allowing for stochastic volatilities and 
correlation (see Fonseca et al. 2007, for example).
Calibration of  the model to historical data gives model-implied quotes falling 
within the range of  quotes obtained from market participants such as those pro-
vided in Figure 2.4. The results on the optimal allocation to the correlation swap 
are presented in Table 2.3. Biffis et al. (2012b) define the surplus as above, where we 
recall that k captures the importance of  the plan’s liabilities, the limiting case k = 0 
representing the asset-only case. From Table 2.3 we see that the optimal allocation 
to bonds increases as the liabilities become more important (higher k). The optimal 
allocation to the correlation swap is financed by reducing the position in both equi-
ties and bonds, and is decreasing in k. The intuition is that mean-variance optimi-
zation increases the allocation to bonds as the importance of  the liabilities increases 
(because bonds have a risk profile closer to that of  the liabilities), thus reducing the 
exposure to stock-bond correlation risk. The higher the pension plan’s aversion to 
the volatility of  the surplus, the stronger the effect.
Collateralization of Hedging Instruments
The global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of  bilateral counter-
party risk and collateralization for over-the-counter instruments, spurring a num-
ber of  responses from market participants and regulators (e.g. ISDA 2009, 2010a). 
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Although there is no commonly accepted framework yet for marking to market/
model such exotic instruments as longevity swaps, hedgers and hedge suppliers 
look to other markets to provide a reference model for counterparty risk assess-
ment and mitigation. In interest-rate swap markets, for example, the most com-
mon form of  credit enhancement is the posting of  collateral. According to the 
International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA), almost every swap at 
major financial institutions is ‘bilaterally’ collateralized (ISDA 2010b), meaning 
that either party is required to post collateral depending on whether the market 
value of  the swap is positive or negative. Collateralization addresses the concerns 
aired by pension trustees regarding the safety of  hedging instruments, but intro-
duces an additional dimension in the cost/benefit assessment of  de-risking solu-
tions. The ‘risk premium’ embedded in a transaction then reflects not only the 
compensation for the risk being transferred and the cost of  regulatory capital 
involved in the transaction, but also the expected costs to be incurred from posting 
collateral during the life of  the trade. In an environment where good quality col-
lateral is scarce, counterparty risk mitigation may therefore lead to higher prices 
and reduce the appeal of  OTC instruments commonly used by pension plans in 
LDI programs.
To give an example, let us consider the case of  a longevity swap and first take 
the perspective of  a reinsurer (the hedge supplier) dealing with a pension plan (the 
hedger). Whenever the swap is sufficiently out-of-the-money to the hedge supplier, 
the hedge supplier is required to post collateral, which can be used by the hedger 
to mitigate losses in the event of  default. Although interest on collateral is typi-
cally rebated, there is both a funding cost and an opportunity cost, as the posting 
of  collateral depletes the resources the hedge supplier can use to meet her capital 
requirements at aggregate level as well as to write additional business. Conversely, 
Table 2.3 Portfolio weights for a pension plan with mean-variance preferences over surplus 
returns
γ = 5 γ = 30
k 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1
Panel A. Without stock-bond correlation swap
Stocks 0.415 0.371 0.336 0.415 0.262 0.190
Bonds 0.585 0.629 0.664 0.585 0.738 0.810
Panel B. With stock-bond correlation swap
Stocks 0.401 0.360 0.327 0.401 0.256 0.187
Bonds 0.568 0.612 0.647 0.568 0.723 0.796
Correlation swap 0.031 0.028 0.026 0.031 0.021 0.017
Notes: This table reports the asset portfolio weights for differing values of  k, the importance of  liabilities, 
and γ, the risk aversion of  the pension plan. Panel A reports the weights for when investable assets 
include only stocks and bonds. Panel B reports the weights for the case when correlation swaps are 
available for trade.
Source: Biffis et al. (2012b).
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whenever the swap is sufficiently in-the-money to the hedge supplier, the hedge 
supplier will receive collateral from the counterparty, thus benefiting from capi-
tal relief  in regulatory valuations and freeing up capital that can be used to sell 
additional longevity protection. The benefits can be far larger if  collateral can be 
re-hypothecated—that is, if  collateral is not segregated and can be re-pledged for 
other purposes. The same considerations can be made from the viewpoint of  the 
hedger, but the funding needs and opportunity costs of  the two parties are unlikely 
to offset each other exactly. Hence they will ultimately affect the pricing of  the 
hedging instrument. This is particularly relevant for transactions involving parties 
subject to different regulatory frameworks. In the U.K. and several other countries, 
for example, pension liabilities are more capital intensive for hedge suppliers, such 
as insurers, than for pension plans.8
Challenges Ahead
Pension plans face a number of  challenges threatening the sustainable and orderly 
provision of  retirement income to plan members. Well-known issues affecting the 
liability side, such as low interest rates and rising life expectancy (e.g. IMF 2012), 
are exacerbated by dangerous incentives on the asset side (‘hunt for yield’ in mar-
kets distorted by quantitative easing), as well as by a changing regulatory landscape 
that may force pension plans to recognize funding levels that are much lower than 
lenient accounting standards might suggest. There is an opportunity for regula-
tion to create the right incentives for sponsors and trustees to consider the value of  
de-risking strategies, and engage with financial institutions and the insurance com-
munity to ensure that the risks of  retirement provisions can be shared more widely 
and more efficiently. We give some examples of  current challenges facing the 
demand and supply of  de-risking solutions: collateralization of  OTC derivatives; 
differential regulatory standards in the pension buyout market; and risk-taking 
incentives in delegated asset management.
A Changing Regulatory Landscape
Both the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (signed 
into law by President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010) and the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) in Europe are likely to have a major impact on 
the way financial institutions will manage counterparty risk in the coming years. 
It is unclear whether centralized clearing will lead to lower utilization of  deriva-
tive instruments due to scarcity of  collateral and funding costs associated with ini-
tial margins and possibly variation margins (Singh and Aitken 2009; Heller and 
Vause 2012; Sidanius and Zikes 2012; Bauer et al. 2013). What seems likely is that, 
for derivatives exempted from centralized clearing (such as inflation and longevity 
swaps), pension plans will be treated as ‘covered entities’ by regulators—in other 
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words, in the same way as financial firms and systemically important non-financial 
firms. EMIR, for example, captures pension funds as financial counterparties, so 
one might expect pension plans to be considered as covered entities when E.U. 
regulators finalize the rules. This could possibly result in pension funds being 
required to exchange variation margins from the beginning of  2015, after which 
they would be subject to two-way posting of  initial margins that will be segregated 
(see BIS-IOSCO 2013). These requirements will be phased in over 2015–2019 and 
will mainly affect large plans. For example, only covered entities with more than 
a notional €3 trillion of  non-cleared swaps will be subject to these initial margin 
requirements, whereas entities with less than €8 billion of  non-cleared swaps will 
be required to meet the requirements from 2019 onwards. The proposals currently 
being discussed suggest that initial margins will rely on standard risk measures 
(value-at-risk at 99 percent confidence interval over a 10-day horizon) computed 
with a model or standard tables. Eligible collateral will range from cash and bonds 
to corporate bonds and major equity indices (with haircuts).
The costs associated with these regulatory changes could be significant. For 
smaller and larger plans, in particular, the collateral management process will have 
to become an integral part of  ALM and LDI. This could make pension buyouts 
and buy-ins more appealing because of  their ‘hedge and forget’ nature, although 
the regulatory changes described above will also affect the LDI programs of  buyout 
firms, making buyouts more expensive.
At the same time, recent innovation in the European marketplace is making it 
easier for smaller plans to cope with counterparty risk mitigation protocols. For 
example, the Credit Support Annex (CSA—the legal document that supports the 
collateral of  derivatives transactions; see ISDA 1996) may now take the form of  
an umbrella CSA covering a consortium of  pension plans engaging in LDI with 
a common asset manager. It is also increasingly common to see multi-currency 
cash/bond CSAs, as well as investment-grade credit CSAs, offering pension plans 
the option to deliver collateral in different forms and currency. Similarly, there 
are instruments being designed around the collateral management process, such 
as margin lending facilities and collateral swaps.9 This suggests that the tools to 
respond to regulatory changes are already available and are being currently tested 
in the LDI programs of  several pension plans.
Pension Buyouts and Regulation
Biffis and Blake (2013) explain the mechanics of  pension buyouts by looking at the 
role of  informational asymmetries and differences in regulatory standards between 
hedgers and hedge suppliers. They show that the adverse selection problem faced 
by unsophisticated pension plans (a seller’s curse) transferring their liabilities to 
more informed insurers subject to stricter regulatory rules can have an adverse 
impact on prices, and has prevented a number of  pension plans from accessing the 
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buyout market. This suggests that greater transparency on the liability side could 
provide a more level playing field for pension plans and buyout firms. On the other 
hand, naive information disclosure may exacerbate the adverse selection problem 
by making informed buyers even more informed.
There is an opportunity here for regulators to align the broad actuarial 
assumptions used in DB pension accounting with a more realistic assessment of  
market risk and longevity risk, while leaving the choice of  detailed information 
disclosure to pension funds and their advisors. This could favor the aggrega-
tion of  liabilities and bulk buyouts (as a tool to reduce the information advan-
tage of  buyout firms), while narrowing the gap between buy-side and sell-side 
valuations due to differences in regulatory environments. Transparency can 
further have a beneficial effect in the secondary market for pension liabilities 
(e.g. the market for insurance-linked securities), as it mitigates the adverse selec-
tion problem faced by investors acquiring longevity-linked securities issued by 
buyout firms. Here, specialized insurers can use their information advantage 
to suitably pool longevity exposures and issue securities minimizing the impact 
of  information asymmetries (e.g. Biffis and Blake 2010a). Regulators can there-
fore play an important role, for example by requiring rating agencies to use suf-
ficiently granular data to assess the risk profile of  securitized products, or by 
providing incentives to disclose and use detailed information from the very same 
internal models used to demonstrate the capital resilience of  buyout firms in the 
primary market.
Risk-taking Incentives in Delegated Asset 
Management
Anchoring asset management to long-term liabilities via surplus-based perfor-
mance measures leads to complex risk-taking and risk mitigation incentives. The 
value of  assets and liabilities depends on regulation and accounting rules. On the 
asset side, financial instruments may be valued by using average historical yields 
to smooth out fluctuations in prices, or using historical cost rather than market 
value (e.g. under the accounting standard IAS 39, historical cost can be used for 
instruments classified as held-to-maturity as opposed to available for trading). On 
the liability side, accounting rules often rely on simplified and unrealistic assump-
tions that result in a distorted representation of  the risk profile of  pension liabili-
ties (e.g. the use of  outdated mortality tables in discounting future liabilities). The 
recent push toward market-consistent valuation methods (e.g. IAS 19, IAS 39, 
and IFRS4) has mitigated the distortions induced by accounting measures, at the 
price of  introducing substantial short-term volatility in funding ratios and liability 
portfolios and giving rise to considerable modeling uncertainty when non-tradable 
risks (such as longevity risk) are considered (e.g. Biffis et al. 2010). The first effect 
is due to the use of  market-implied information that may diverge from long-term 
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fundamental values; the second is due to model risk (a reference model is used to 
compute market-consistent values) and parameter risk (mark-to-model exercises 
are affected by uncertainty in parameter estimates). On the one hand, discounting 
by current yields guarantees an accurate description of  the fund’s financial situa-
tion. On the other, using a constant yield smooths out temporary fluctuations in 
the present value of  the liabilities and gives a longer-term description of  a fund’s 
financial condition.
Risk-taking incentives can be classified as arising in the presence of  ex ante pre-
vention measures (e.g. short-sale and other constraints in asset allocation, Value-at-
Risk constraints) and ex post punishment (such as curb in compensation, reputational 
losses, or the costs associated with additional funding from the sponsors). Despite 
their relevance, these issues are still largely unexplored. We now review some recent 
contributions offering some interesting insights on the trade-offs at play in this 
space.
Van Binsbergen and Brandt (2009) study the impact of  regulations on the 
investment decisions of  a DB pension plan. In their model, the optimal asset allo-
cation decisions of  the investment manager are a function of  the plan’s funding 
ratio (defined as the ratio of  its assets to liabilities), interest rates, and the equity 
risk premium. They compare the optimal investment decisions under several 
policy alternatives to understand better the real effects of  financial reporting and 
risk management rules. They evaluate the influence of  ex ante (preventive) and 
ex post (punitive) risk constraints on the gains to dynamic, as opposed to myopic, 
decision-making. They show that, in their model, preventive measures, such as 
Value-at-Risk constraints, tend to decrease the gains to dynamic investment. In 
contrast, punitive constraints, such as mandatory additional contributions from the 
sponsor when the plan becomes underfunded, lead to very large utility gains. They 
also show that financial reporting rules have real effects on investment behavior. 
For example, they argue that the current U.S. requirement to discount liabilities at 
a rolling average of  yields, as opposed to at current yields, induces grossly subop-
timal investment decisions. The way liabilities are computed can drive an impor-
tant wedge between the fund manager’s long-term objective of  maximizing the 
funding ratio and his short-term objective (and/or requirement) of  satisfying risk 
constraints and avoiding additional financial contributions from the plan sponsor.
Buraschi et al. (2012) study the implications of  non-linear managerial incen-
tives and funding contracts for risk-taking and traditional reduced-form tests of  
performance attribution for hedge funds. The authors solve the structural opti-
mal portfolio choice problem of  a hedge fund investor who is subject to (a) perfor-
mance fee-based incentives, (b) funding options by the prime broker, and (c) equity 
investors’ redemption options, which together create a non-linear payoff structure 
that affects endogenous hedge funds’ risk-taking. The resulting optimal portfo-
lio choice is state-dependent due to the time-varying endogenous incentives per-
ceived by the manager, depending on the distance of  the assets under management 
from the high-water mark. This implies that optimal leverage and reduced-form 
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alphas fluctuate over time. This is important since it implies that traditional perfor-
mance regressions with constant coefficients are potentially mis-specified. The call 
option-like performance fee incentive motivates the manager to use more leverage, 
while put option-like features (together with the concern about the future value 
of  the incentive options) induce the manager to reduce leverage when his fund 
underperforms below a given threshold. Although this study uses hedge funds in 
the empirical application, its results have a much broader economic motivation. 
Separating the effect of  risk-taking and skill, based on observed investment per-
formance, is a fundamental problem that affects not only investors in alternative 
investment funds, but also investors in (and regulators of) levered financial institu-
tions such as investment banks or pension funds which employ incentive contracts.
Ang et al. (2012) note there are significant penalties associated with the failure 
to meet liabilities which are not captured by the variance of  the surplus return in 
the static surplus return maximization. They also point out that the 2006 Pension 
Protection Act (PPA) in the U.S.  required that plan funding equal 100 percent 
of  the plan’s liabilities, so underfunded plans were required to fund their plans 
according to rules that result in higher employer contributions.10 The authors list 
additional downside risks associated with underfunding such as higher insurance 
premia, holding higher reserves, and the opportunity costs associated with transfer-
ring money to the pension plan, as well as the cost to beneficiaries who face higher 
default risk of  their plan. To incorporate these real-world effects into their model, 
the authors propose a new model that incorporates downside risk penalties for not 
meeting liabilities. In their model, the shortfall between the asset and liabilities can 
be valued as an option which swaps the value of  the endogenously determined 
optimal portfolio for the value of  the liabilities. The optimal portfolio selection 
exhibits endogenous risk aversion and as the funding ratio deviates from the fully 
funded case in the direction of  underfunding or overfunding, effective risk aversion 
decreases. When funding is low, it is optimal for the manager in the model to take 
on risk, betting on the chance that liabilities can be covered. When the plan is over-
funded the manager also takes on more risk, as liabilities are already well matched, 
and so the manager decides to invest aggressively in risky securities. In contrast to 
Detemple and Rindisbacher (2008), where shortfall costs have a utility cost for a 
risk-averse fund sponsor, the shortfall cost is reflected in an actual real-world value 
through an option calculation in Ang et al. (2012).11 Amenc et al. (2010) also pre-
sent an LDI model that incorporates an option, but it is exogenous rather than 
endogenous in their framework.
Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the key drivers behind the emergence of  LDI, illustrating 
the main principles behind this variant of  ALM, as well as some of  the most com-
monly used hedging tools. We also described several emerging de-risking tools 
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such as pension buyouts/ins, longevity swaps, and tail-risk hedges that have gained 
popularity in light of  the rise in cross-asset correlation associated with quantitative 
easing. Some of  the main challenges ahead include changes in pension regulation, 
centralized clearing of  OTC derivatives, and risk-taking incentives in delegated 
asset management for pension ALM.
Notes
 1. Other examples include Boulier et al. (1995), Sundaresan and Zapatero (1997), Cairns 
(2000), and Van Binsbergen and Brandt (2009).
 2. The authors examine a dynamic asset allocation problem of  a fund manager with von 
Neumann–Morgenstern preferences with (a) terminal utility function defined over the 
excess of  liquid wealth over minimum liability coverage tolerated, and (b) intermediate 
utility function defined over dividends.
 3. See, for example, Biffis and Blake (2010b, 2013).
 4. A quanto option is a cash-settled option whose payoff is converted into a third currency 
at maturity at a pre-specied rate, called the quanto factor. In our case, the pension pay-
ments toward a homogenous cohort of  pensioners are obtained by multiplying the 
payments due to a representative pensioner by the number of  survivors in that cohort. 
A similar feature exacerbated the problems faced by Equitable Life when dealing with 
guaranteed annuity options (see Biffis and Millossovich 2006).
 5. For details on the collateralization of  these instruments and its impact on their valua-
tion, see Biffis et al. (2012a).
 6. This section draws on Biffis et al. (2012b).
 7. Such an approach is justified by the work of  Fleming et al. (1999), Chordia et al. (2005), 
and Connolly et al. (2005), who find evidence of  volatility linkages between stock and 
bond markets which also drive the correlation between these markets.
 8. See Biffis et al. (2012a), and Biffis and Blake (2013), Davis (2014), and Lundbergh et al. 
(2014) for additional discussion.
 9. ‘In these arrangements a [pension plan] lends a bank liquid securities such as govern-
ment bonds—for which the bank pays a small fee—and in return the bank pledges 
highly rated but less liquid collateral such as mortgage-backed securities—bonds backed 
by pools of  loans—where the markets are still tainted by the “toxic” tag from the finan-
cial crisis’ (Hughes 2011).
 10. Ang et al. (2012) illustrate the penalties associated with underfunding by pointing to 
the case of  AT&T, whose funding status changed from $17 billion surplus in 2007 to a 
nearly $4 billion deficit in 2008, contributing to the decline of  AT&T’s stock from 2007 
to 2008.
 11. They specify the objective function of  the fund as mean-variance over the asset returns 
plus a downside risk penalty on the liability shortfall:
W A AE r r
c
A
P W L Amax ( ) var( ) ( , , )− −
γ
2 0
0 0
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  where c is a penalty cost associated with the downside and P w L A, ,0 0( )  is the endog-
enous value of  the option as the fund manager can reduce the value of  this option by 
increasing the correlation of  the optimal portfolio with the pension liabilities.
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